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Abstract 
 
 
Using the Mike Nifong disciplinary case in North Carolina as a focal point, the 
author examines the disciplinary rules pertaining to public speech by attorneys during the 
pendency of an adjudicatory proceeding.  The author argues that in light of the Supreme 
Court’s 2002 decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, certain provisions of 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 3.6 and 3.8, may violate the first 
amendment, at least as applied to an elected prosecutor speaking during a political 
campaign.  While former District Attorney Nifong made several statements to the media 
during the so-called “Duke Lacrosse” investigation that were clearly overzealous and 
impermissible even under the narrowest reading of the pertinent disciplinary rules, other 
public statements that Nifong made and was later disciplined for may have been 
protected by the first amendment, had the respondent raised a constitutional challenge in 
his North Carolina Disciplinary Commission proceeding.  The author uses the Nifong 
disbarment case as a lens through which to examine current ethical restrictions on 
attorney speech, and to highlight provisions that might be vulnerable to a constitutional 
challenge.  
 
 
I.   Introduction 
 
Former District Attorney Mike Nifong made several statements to the media 
during the so-called “Duke Lacrosse” case that were overzealous, and clearly contrary to 
a prosecutor’s dual responsibilities to seek justice and to preserve a defendant’s right to a 
fair trial.  Notable among Nifong’s more outlandish public comments were his 
characterization of the rape as “particularly abhorrent” and “reprehensible,” his 
analogizing the case to a “cross burning,” his expression of personal “confidence” and 
“satisfaction” that a rape had in fact occurred, and his criticism of the targets for 
refus[ing] to speak to investigators” upon “advice of counsel.”1  After a hearing, the 
North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Committee ruled that these comments violated 
                                                 
*Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Boston College Law School.  I am indebted 
to my colleague Judy McMorrow for providing comments on an earlier draft, and my students Matthew 
Page and Michael Goldman for their invaluable assistance in researching and editing this essay. 
1 North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Commission Findings of Fact 7/10/07 ¶¶ 22, 29, 31, 42. 
North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct 3.6(a) (“substantial likelihood of 
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding”) and 3.8(f) (“substantial likelihood of 
heightening public condemnation of the accused”).2  The Commission ordered Nifong 
disbarred.3
 
After the disciplinary hearing, Nifong essentially acknowledged that the 
disbarment sanction was appropriate and agreed not to appeal.4  In all likelihood Nifong 
accepted this sanction because other misconduct charges against him – for failing to 
disclose exculpatory DNA evidence that showed the presence of multiple unidentified 
males on the rape kit specimen (in violation of North Carolina Rule 3.8(d)) and for lying 
to the court about his compliance with discovery requests (in violation of North Carolina 
Rule 3.3(a)) – were so serious that they probably would have led to disbarment even 
absent claims of improper statements to the media.5
 
The lack of an appeal in the Mike Nifong disciplinary case is unfortunate in at 
least one respect-- it deprives the Supreme Court of North Carolina of an opportunity to 
clarify the line between permissible and impermissible public comment by elected 
prosecutors during criminal investigations.  Several of the statements District Attorney 
Nifong admittedly made to the media about the rape investigation, and that the 
Commission both alleged and found to be improper, seem to be entirely consistent with a 
prosecutor’s duty to inform the public about the priorities of his office, the nature and 
status of criminal cases, and the reasons for the discretionary law enforcement decisions 
that he has made.  For example, Nifong was determined to have acted improperly in 
making a statement to the media that the alleged victim’s demeanor at the time of the 
medical examination was consistent with sexual assault;6 in asserting that he might 
consider filing charges against players present at the party who failed to come forward 
with information;7 in stating publicly that a medical examination revealed evidence   
consistent with rape;8 and in revealing to the media that the accuser was able “to identify 
at least one of her attackers.”9  These are the very types of statements that prosecutors 
across this country routinely make about pending criminal cases in order to keep their 
communities informed about threats to public safety and the ongoing enforcement 
activities of government officials. Not only might some of these latter statements have 
been permissible under a narrow reading of the pertinent disciplinary rules, but they may 
have been protected by the First Amendment.   
 
Focusing on what Nifong did wrong in the Duke Lacrosse case is relatively 
straightforward, and has been undertaken by many others.  His conduct throughout the 
investigation and prosecution of the Duke Lacrosse players was egregious and 
                                                 
2 N.C. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.6(a) and 3.8(f) (2007). 
3 Order of Discipline 7/10/07 ¶ 1. 
4 Aaron Beard, Prosecutor to be Disbarred For Duke Lacrosse ‘Fiasco’, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 17, 
2007, p. 6. 
5 See Amended Compl. ¶¶ 219 and 230 (January 24, 2007); Conclusions of Law 7/10/07 ¶¶ (b) and (d). 
6 Findings of Fact 7/10/07 ¶ 25. 
7 Findings of Fact 7/10/07 ¶ 18. 
8 Findings of Fact 7/10/07 ¶ 38. 
9 Findings of Fact 7/10/07 ¶ 49. 
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reprehensible.  Focusing on what Mike Nifong may have done right in the case, but was 
disciplined for nonetheless, is a far riskier and more difficult venture.  In my view, there 
may have been two “rushes to judgment” in the Duke case; the prosecutor’s rush to 
condemn the students before considering and investigating alternative theories of what 
happened at the lacrosse party, and the Disciplinary Commission’s rush to disbar Mike 
Nifong for very badly mishandling a high profile criminal case.  Because Michael Nifong 
did not raise a first amendment challenge to the discipline imposed on him for improper 
statements to the media, and because he accepted disbarment and waived his right to 
appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court was deprived of an occasion to clarify the 
precise contours of Rule 3.6 and 3.8 as they pertain to public comments by elected 
prosecutors.  My goal in this essay is to use the facts of the Duke Lacrosse case a focal 
point for examining restrictions on attorney speech, and to analyze those aspects of 
disciplinary rules 3.6 and 3.8 that may be vulnerable to constitutional challenge. 
 
 
II.   Statements to the Media: The Parameters of Rules 3.6 and 3.8 
 
 Two ethical rules commonly in effect in most jurisdictions constrain public 
comments made by a prosecutor.10  ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 
prevents a prosecutor from making extrajudicial statements that he knows or reasonably 
should know present a “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicatory 
proceeding.”11  ABA Model Rule 3.8(f) prevents a prosecutor from making extrajudicial 
comments that “heighten public condemnation of the accused.”12  The scope and purpose 
of these two rules are different.  Rule 3.6 applies to all attorneys and it is designed to 
safeguard adjudicatory proceedings.  Rule 3.8(f) applies only to prosecutors and is 
designed to protect the interests of the accused in his reputation and privacy.  Although it 
is beyond the scope of this essay, ABA Model Rule 8.4(c) (prohibiting conduct 
“involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”) may also come into play in 
certain circumstances if an attorney knowingly makes false statements to the media.13
 
                                                 
10 For the purpose of this essay I will focus on the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, which have been adopted in whole or in part with some variations by forty-seven states.  With 
respect to media comments, the rules in North Carolina are substantially in accord with the Model Rules for 
all relevant purposes.  See N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.6 and R. 3.8(f). 
11 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R 3.6(a).  Some jurisdictions that otherwise follow the Model Rules 
deviate from this “substantial risk of material prejudice” standard and forbid only attorney speech that 
poses a serious or imminent threat of material prejudice to the proceedings, presumably a heightened 
threshold that prohibits an even narrower range of speech.  See D.C. BAR APPX. A, Rule 3.6; ILL. SUP. CT. 
R. PROF'L CONDUCT, R 3.6(a); OK. R. PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.6.  New Mexico prohibits extrajudicial 
comments by attorneys about pending criminal proceedings that create “a clear and present danger” of 
prejudicing the proceeding.  N.M. R. PROF. CONDUCT, R 16-306.  
12 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.8(f). 
13 For example, the North Carolina Disciplinary Commission’s Amended Complaint accused Nifong of 
violating Rule 8.4(c) by falsely suggesting to the media that DNA results may have been inconclusive 
because a condom may have been used in the attack, when Nifong had already received the emergency 
nurse’s examination report indicating that the alleged victim claimed no condom was used.  Amended 
Complaint, ¶ 117-124. The final order of the Disciplinary Commission found no violation of Rule 8.4(c).  
Transcript of Hearing, June 16, 2007, Final Order, p. 5. 
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 Comment [5] to ABA Model Rule 3.6 contains a list of six topics that “ordinarily” 
will be considered “more likely than not” to have a material prejudicial effect on a 
proceeding.  Essentially, this portion of the commentary creates a rebuttable presumption 
of prejudice when an attorney’s public comments concern the following six topics: (1) 
the character, reputation, credibility, or prior criminal record of a party, suspect, or 
witness; (2) the possibility of a plea of guilty, the contents or existence of a confession, or 
the refusal or failure to make a statement; (3) the performance or results of any 
examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or 
test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented; (4) any 
opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect; (5) information that the 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a 
trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; 
and (6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included 
therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the 
defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.14
 
 Many of the off-limits topics set forth in Rule 3.6 are directed at public reference 
to evidence that may turn out to be inadmissible at trial, such as witness impeachment 
material, forensic tests, and confessions.  The concern is that once such influential 
material finds its way into the public domain, the defendant may not be able to receive a 
fair trial from an impartial jury even if the evidence is later excluded. 
 
 In addition to these off-limits topics, ABA Model Rule 3.6 contains a so-called 
“safe-harbor” provision that allows public comment by attorneys on specified subjects, 
irrespective of whether they risk prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding.  After setting 
forth the general prohibition in paragraph (a), paragraph (b) of Rule 3.6 provides that 
“[n]otwithstanding paragraph (a),” a lawyer may discuss with the media the following 
seven subjects: the claim, offense or defense involved; information contained in a public 
record; that an investigation is in progress; the scheduling of any step in litigation; a 
request for assistance in obtaining evidence or information; a warning to the public of 
dangers; and [in a criminal case only], the identity of investigating officers, the identity, 
residence, occupation and family status of the accused, the fact, time and place of arrest, 
and any information necessary to aid in apprehension of the accused. 
 
 While Rule 3.6 is directed at public statements by lawyers that may prejudice the 
outcome of an adjudicatory proceeding, a separate provision of the Model Rules 
applicable only to prosecutors prohibits extrajudicial communications that would 
unnecessarily disparage the accused.  ABA Model Rule 3.8(f)(“Special Responsibilities 
of a Prosecutor”) provides that:  
 
“Except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and 
extent of the prosecutor’s action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement 
purpose,” a prosecutor in a criminal case shall “refrain from making extrajudicial 
                                                 
14 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.6, Comment [5].  See Attorney Grievance Commission v. 
Gansler, 377 Md. 656, 682; 835 A.2d 548, 563 (2003) (reprimanding the State’s Attorney for making 
public comments about suspect’s arrest, confession and possibility of plea bargain). 
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comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation 
of the accused…”15
 
 According to the 1994 ABA Report recommending this amendment to Model 
Rule 3.8, the revision was designed to prohibit “gratuitous comments” by a prosecutor 
serving only to increase “public opprobrium” toward the defendant.16  Examples of such 
piling on might include a description of graphic details about a particularly gruesome or 
heinous crime, the display of shocking or disturbing physical evidence, or reference to 
criminal associations or uncharged acts of the accused. 
 
 
III.   First Amendment Protections for Attorney Speech  
 
Most chief prosecutors at the state level are elected officials, and political speech 
by candidates is “at the core of our first amendment freedoms.”17  It therefore seems 
beyond peradventure that prosecutors like Mike Nifong have first amendment rights.  
Although courts at one time condoned the right of the state to restrict speech of public 
employees,18 this position has since been abandoned in recognition that government 
employees do not shed their constitutional protections at the door when they enter the 
workplace.19
 
 It is important to remember that the allegedly improper comments that Mike 
Nifong made to the media – and those for which he was disbarred – were made in March 
and April of 2006, in the middle of an ongoing political campaign.  After serving over 
twenty-five years as an Assistant and then Chief Assistant District Attorney in Durham 
County, Nifong was appointed to the District Attorney’s position in April 2005, after his 
then boss was elevated to a judgeship.20  Nifong had only one year in the head job to 
                                                 
15 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.8(f). 
16 Gillers and Simon, REGULATIONS OF LAWYERS, STATUTES AND STANDARDS p.295 (Aspen 
2007) 
17 Republican Party  v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781 (2002).  Even in Gentile, Justice Kennedy stated that in 
order to satisfy the First Amendment, restrictions on attorney speech must be “neutral as to point of view, 
applying equally to all attorneys participating in pending proceedings,” clearly contemplating that 
prosecutors were protected.  Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991).  While Kennedy 
argued that a state may have a more compelling interest in regulating prosecutor speech than defense 
attorney speech for reasons of power disparities and greater access to insider information, he did not 
suggest that prosecutors are not entitled to First Amendment protection at all.  Id. at 1056. 
18 See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 (1892) (Holmes. C.J.).  See also the concurring 
opinion of Justice Stewart in Columbia Broadcasting v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 139 
n.7 (1973), where Justice Stewart argued that the First Amendment protects private citizens, but does not 
limit the power of the state in controlling its own agents. 
19 In the context of employment disputes, the Supreme Court has recognized that government employees 
have only limited rights to free speech in the exercise of their official duties.  See Connick v. Myers, 461 
U.S. 1381 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).  The Pickering line of cases 
suggests that in evaluating employment disputes (demotion, suspension, discharge) the court should 
balance the free speech rights of public employees with the state’s right to promote efficiency in the 
workplace.  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 586. 
20 Benjamin Niolet, Durham District Attorney Will Don a Judge's Robe, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, 
North Carolina), April 19, 2005, p. A1. 
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prove himself worthy of the office before facing his first election.  The Democratic 
primary was a three-way race scheduled for May 2, 2006.21  At that time there were no 
announced Republican candidates for the position, and pundits assumed that the winner 
of the primary would win the general election in November.22  The alleged rape occurred 
on March 12, 2006 and the first indictments were returned on April 17, 2006, right in the 
thick of this heated primary battle.23   
 
There are several different classifications of speech, and each enjoys a different 
level of constitutional protection.  So-called “fighting words,” or speech which poses a 
clear and imminent danger to public safety, enjoys no protection whatsoever.24  
Commercial speech may be regulated so long as the government demonstrates a 
“substantial interest” to be achieved by the regulation.25  But where the government seeks 
to restrain religious speech or speech related to a political/public issue, such a restriction 
must withstand “strict scrutiny;” that is, the government must demonstrate that the 
restraint “is 1) narrowly tailored to serve (2) a compelling state interest.”26  An ethical 
canon restricting an attorney’s speech upon threat of discipline is a prior restraint.27  The 
courts entertain a “heavy presumption” that every prior restraint on protected speech is 
unconstitutional.28
 
 Attorney speech about ongoing cases serves a valuable public function.  “The 
subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and 
deliberation over questions of public policy.”29  At least in the context of attempts to 
regulate the media’s access to judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court has stated that 
“[i]t would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher…importance to 
the people than the manner in which criminal trials are conducted.”30
 
 Public speech by prosecutors serves several additional purposes not furthered by 
attorney speech generally.31  First, the public has a right to be kept informed about how a 
prosecutor is using public resources, and what choices are being made about enforcement 
priorities.  As public servants, prosecutors have a fiduciary obligation to apprise their 
                                                 
21 Nifong won the primary, but with a plurality rather than a majority of the votes cast.  Nifong earned 45% 
of the votes.  His closest contender, another former prosecutor in the Durham County District Attorney’s 
office, was Freda Black.  She earned 42% of the votes cast in the primary.  Sharif Durhams and Eric 
Frazier, Duke Case Will Go On: Incumbent Doesn't See Win as Vindication for Actions in Rape Inquiry, 
THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (North Carolina), May 3, 2006. 
22 After substantial adverse publicity against Nifong over the summer of 2006, two write-in candidates, 
Lewis Cheek and Steve Monks, tried unsuccessfully to unseat Nifong in the November general election. 
23 See FF/CL ¶¶ 16-62. 
24 Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
25 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
26 See White, 536 U.S. at 774-75; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 411 (1974). 
27 See Mississippi Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So.2d 1006, 1011 (Miss.2004) 
(analyzing judicial canon as prior restraint). 
28 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975). 
29 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R.  3.6, Comment [1]. 
30 Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (holding that the right of the press and the 
public to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment). 
31 R. Michael Cassidy, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 116 (West 2005). 
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constituents of how they are managing the public duties entrusted to them.  Second, a 
prosecutor’s comments to the media may serve to promote public safety by warning the 
public of continuing dangers in the community, or cautioning them about particularly 
vulnerable activities or sources of risk.  Third, public statements by prosecutors may 
assist in ongoing investigations by encouraging other witnesses or victims to come 
forward and report crime.  Prosecutors often utilize the press to request public assistance 
in catching criminals who might otherwise remain at large.  Finally, public dissemination 
of a prosecutor’s activities is necessary to fulfill the deterrent aims of the criminal law; 
unless the public is notified about indictments and convictions, other would-be 
perpetrators may not be appropriately dissuaded from engaging in criminal activity.32
 
 Media statements by prosecutors – particularly while criminal investigations and 
trials are ongoing – pose several significant dangers.  Intense media interests in criminal 
proceedings and the powerful effect of modern methods of communication can combine 
to turn previously “local” criminal investigations into worldwide public spectacles.  A 
prosecutor’s extrajudicial comments can jeopardize a defendant’s rights to a fair trial by 
implanting suggestions of guilt in the minds of the public before the charges can be fully 
and fairly exposed in a court of law, thus undercutting the presumption of innocence to 
which all defendants are entitled.  Statements to the media also risk irreparably 
destroying the defendant’s reputation and ability to earn a livelihood.  Even if the accused 
is subsequently acquitted of the charges, the taint left by the government’s accusations of 
wrongdoing may never wash entirely clean.  Finally, media coverage of the prosecutor’s 
allegations may interfere with a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.  If 
the government’s theory of its case is widely broadcast, the defendant may feel 
compelled to respond rather than remain silent and put the government to its burden of 
proof.  For each of these reasons, some curtailment of a prosecutor’s comments to the 
media may be necessary to safeguard the fairness and accuracy of adjudicative 
proceedings.33
 
 In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada34  the Supreme Court confronted this classic 
clash of values, and set out the permissible contours of ethical restrictions on non-
commercial attorney speech.35  Gentile was actually two majority decisions.  Five 
justices, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ruled that Nevada’s 
“substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard satisfied First Amendment 
safeguards.  Rejecting a facial challenge to Nevada’s disciplinary rule, the Rehnquist 
majority held that a “clear and present danger” need not be manifest before a state may 
constitutionally regulate attorney speech regarding ongoing cases.  The Rehnquist 
majority ruled that lawyers “in pending cases” may be subject to ethical restrictions on 
                                                 
32 In addition to serving a deterrent function, the Supreme Court has recognized that publicity about 
ongoing criminal cases provides an outlet for “community concern, hostility, and emotion,” which is 
essential to achieve the cathartic effect of retributive justice.  Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571-72. 
33 See generally, Scott M. Matheson, The Prosecutor, the Press, and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 
865, 868 (1990). 
34 Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
35 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.6 – prohibiting attorney speech that poses a substantial risk of 
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding – was amended in 1994 to comport with Gentile. 
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speech which an ordinary citizen or the press could not be,36 because membership in the 
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,37 and because such a restriction may be 
necessary to ensure a fair trial.38  Five Justices, led by Justice Kennedy, ruled that the 
Nevada disciplinary rule then in effect was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the 
petitioner (a criminal defense attorney), because Nevada’s safe harbor allowed an 
attorney to state “without elaboration” the “general” nature of his claim or defense.39  
Justice Kennedy believed that this imprecise language failed to give the petitioner in 
Gentile fair notice of what was permitted and what was prohibited.40  The “swing” vote 
was cast by Justice O’Connor; she joined the Rehnquist majority in approving the 
“substantial likelihood of material prejudice standard” and the Kennedy majority in 
finding the Nevada safe harbor provision impermissibly vague.41
 
Viewed through the lens of Gentile, the discipline of Mike Nifong may seem to 
satisfy first amendment standards.  After all, the pertinent North Carolina disciplinary 
rule incorporates the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice’ standard upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Gentile.  But Gentile is far from the Supreme Court’s final word on the 
subject of attorney speech.   In its more recent decision, Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White,42 the Supreme Court ruled in another closely divided 5-4 opinion that a Minnesota 
rule of judicial conduct applicable to judicial candidates violated the First Amendment.  
The disciplinary rule at issue applied both to sitting judges and practicing attorneys,43 and 
prohibited a candidate for judicial office from “announcing his or her views on disputed 
legal or political issues.”44   Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, ruled that this judicial 
canon was a content-based restriction subject to strict scrutiny.   Addressing Minnesota’s 
decision to select judges by election, Scalia noted that “if the state chooses to tap the 
energy and the legitimizing power of the democratic process, it must accord the 
participants in that process…the First Amendment rights that attach to their roles.”45  
“We have never allowed the government to prohibit candidates from communicating 
relevant information to voters during an election.”46  “The announce clause …burdens a 
category of speech that ‘is at the core of our First Amendment freedoms’—speech about 
the qualifications of candidates for public office.”47   
 
                                                 
36 Gentile,  501 U.S. at 1070-1071. 
37 Id. at 1066.  “[A]lthough litigants do not ‘surrender their First Amendment rights at the courthouse door,' 
those rights may be subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting,” emphasis supplied.  Id. at 
1073, quoting, Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467, U.S. 20, 32-33 (1984). 
38 Id. at 1073-75. 
39 Id. at 1048-49. 
40 The 1993 amendment to Model Rule 3.6 deleted the words “general” and “without elaboration” found 
unconstitutionally vague by the Kennedy majority in Gentile. 
41 Id. at 1081. 
42 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
43 Id. at 768. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 788, citing Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991). 
46 Id. at 782.  “The role that elected officials play in our society makes it all the more imperative that they 
be allowed freely to express themselves on matters of current public importance.” Id. at 781-782, citing 
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962). 
47 Id. at 774.  
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In White, Justice Scalia rejected the argument that the state’s real or perceived 
goal in “impartiality” could satisfy its heavy burden of justifying its “announce” clause 
under strict scrutiny analysis.  If impartiality means neutrality toward parties, the 
regulation was vastly under-inclusive, because it prohibited speech about disputed “legal 
or political issues,” saying absolutely nothing about the parties to a dispute.48  According 
to Justice Scalia, if the state’s goal were to select judges with no preconceptions on legal 
issues, this could not be a compelling interest because it would be both impossible and 
undesirable to do so.49    Justice Scalia recognized that lower courts had narrowed the 
reach of the Minnesota “announce” clause to “disputed issues that are likely to come 
before the candidate if he is elected judge.”50  However, Justice Scalia did not think that 
this limiting construction saved the canon from constitutional infirmity, because “[t]here 
is almost no legal or political issue that is unlikely to come before a judge of an American 
court, state of federal, of general jurisdiction.”51  Justice Scalia reasoned that if electing 
judges who have no prior opinions on legal issues is not a compelling state interest, 
pretending to preserve the “appearance” of this lack of preconception also could not 
reasonably constitute a compelling state interest.52     
 
The Court’s decision in White has provided “enormous momentum” to attacks on 
the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and the state rules derived therefrom.53  
There is now ample basis for doubting whether ABA Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8 could 
survive a similar constitutional challenge.  First and foremost, five of the nine justices 
who participated in deciding Gentile are no longer sitting on the Court.  Even former 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote in Gentile that membership in the bar entails some 
sacrifice of the privileges normally enjoyed by private citizens, joined the White majority 
in ruling that members of the bar running for office must be allowed to state their views 
on matters of public importance.  After White, if states choose to select their prosecutors 
through the electoral process, they are going to have to tolerate a certain amount of 
campaign rhetoric (even case-based campaign rhetoric). To paraphrase Justice 
O’Connor’s concurring opinion in White, if North Carolina has a problem with 
overzealous statements made by prosecutors to the media during a re-election campaign, 
it is a problem that the state has largely brought upon itself by the manner in which it has 
chosen to select its district attorneys.54  Where core political speech at issue, the first 
amendment requires states to give “breathing space”55 to the communication of 
information.   
 
                                                 
48 Id. at 776. 
49 Id. at 777-778.  
50 Id. at 771, emphasis supplied. 
51 Id. at 772, quoting Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd. 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993).  
52 Id. at 778.   
53 George D. Brown, Political Judges and Popular Justice:  A Conservative Victory or a Conservative 
Dilemma?,  49  WM. & MARY L. REV. at ___ (forthcoming 2008)(on file with author)(arguing that White 
has led to the further politicization of judicial campaigns, which should be considered a disturbing trend for 
federalists who care about the competence of the state judiciary).  
54 White, 536 U.S. at  792. 
55 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982). 
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Moreover, the Rehnquist majority in Gentile did not really apply strict scrutiny to 
Nevada Rule 3.6, at least as that test was later construed and applied in White.  
Rehnquist’s opinion in Gentile did not invoke the term “strict scrutiny,” nor did it 
demand an explanation for the restriction that was “compelling.”  The Rehnquist majority 
in Gentile simply ruled that states strike a permissible “balance” between the interests of 
the speaker and the state’s own interest in regulating the legal profession when they 
prohibit attorney speech that poses a “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a 
proceeding.”56   This is really not strict scrutiny at all.  Where political speech is at issue, 
a proper application of strict scrutiny requires the state to demonstrate that the restriction 
serves a compelling state interest, and that it is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.57   
The court should not “weigh” the value of the speech, or “balance” the speaker’s interest 
in making public comment against the state’s interest in restricting it.      
 
One reading of Gentile and White might suggest a relevant distinction between 
comments about pending cases, and comments about general legal issues likely to arise 
before a court in the future.58   Under this view, the former might be regulated under a 
standard less exacting than the “clear and present danger” test, while the latter may not 
be.   The Court in White appeared to leave room to regulate the speech of judicial 
candidates about litigation actually pending before them.59  But I think that this 
distinction does not survive a close reading of White or its progeny, at least with respect 
to elected prosecutors commenting about pending cases or investigations. The 
respondents and dissenters in White relied upon a construction of “impartiality” that 
would include “open-mindedness;” that is, the state has a compelling interest in 
protecting the fairness of adjudicatory hearings by ensuring that judges are disinterested 
and willing to remain receptive to competing arguments.60  They argued that the 
Minnesota “announce” clause furthered this interest in open-mindedness by promoting 
both an unbiased, disinterested judiciary and the public appearance of neutrality.61  After 
White, however, several federal courts have struck down so-called “pledges and 
promises” clauses of state judicial codes that prohibited judges from publicly stating their 
                                                 
56 Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075. 
57 White, 536 U.S. at 774-775, citing Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 
(1989).   
58 Gentile suggests that greater restraint on attorney speech is allowed when a case is ongoing than when it 
is completed.  501 U.S. at 1074 (“the speech of lawyer representing clients in pending cases may be 
regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for regulation of the press.”).    
59 See White, 536 U.S. at 770 (expressing “no view” on whether judicial canon prohibiting a candidate from 
“promising to decide an issue [in] a particular way” would violate the first amendment). 
60 Id. at 778 and Id. at 815 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).  Justice Scalia recognized that this third definition of 
impartiality might present a compelling state interest in limiting judicial speech during an election, but he 
did not proceed to consider whether Minnesota’s canon was narrowly tailored to further this interest, 
because he did not believe that “open-mindedness” was the true purpose motivating the enactment. Id. at 
778.  A judicial candidate in Minnesota can state his position on legal matters both before running for 
election and after being elected by writing books and giving speeches.  See MINN. CODE OF  JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT, Canon 4(B).   If impartiality in terms of “open-mindedness” were truly the purpose behind the 
“announce” clause, Scalia felt that such activity would have been limited as well.   “A law cannot be 
regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order, and thus as justifying a restriction upon truthful 
speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.”  Id. at 780, citing 
Florida Star v B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1991) (Scalia, J. concurring). 
61 See Id. at 815-817 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
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position on matters pending or likely to come before the court 62  Relying on White, these 
courts have ruled that that the “pledge or promise” provision before the court was not 
narrowly tailored to further the state’s interest in an impartial judiciary.63   Where a judge 
stakes out his position on a certain legal subject through extrajudicial speech, this may 
present risks to the fairness of adjudicatory proceedings.  To secure a fair trial for his or 
her client, a future litigant may have to move to recuse the judge who made the 
statements.  Recusal hearings are fraught with costs to the state—including the 
consumption of scarce court time, the risk of error, and the delay from appeal.  But those 
courts which have struck down “pledges and promises” clauses in state judicial canons 
since White have recognized that these risks do not justify prohibiting pledges or 
promises altogether, except perhaps specific promises about how a particular case will be 
decided.64  The same is true of a prosecutor’s speech about pending cases during a 
campaign.   Such speech may taint the views of potential members of the venire.  It may 
make the trial judge’s task more difficult in weeding out potential jurors who have read 
about the case or already formed an opinion about the defendant.  It may require a change 
of venue.  But at a minimum, the lesson of White is that with regards to campaign speech, 
the mere potential of added burdens to the state is not a sufficiently compelling 
justification to survive strict scrutiny. 
 
A second possible way to distinguish White from the Nifong matter is the type of 
election involved; that is, one might argue that judicial elections are different than 
elections in the legislative and executive branches of government, and that prohibitions 
on speech that might be permissible in one forum might be impermissible in another.  
Indeed, Justice Ginsburg in White accused the majority of taking an “election is an 
election” approach to constitutional analysis.65   She argued that judicial elections are 
indeed different from elections for legislative or executive office, because the populace 
was not choosing a candidate who would act at their behest, but rather was choosing a 
magistrate who would act as a neutral, removed from “partisan fray.”66  In his majority 
opinion Justice Scalia declined to address directly the question of whether the first 
amendment allows greater regulation of judicial campaigns than other elective offices,67 
                                                 
62 Cf. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(10)(“A judge shall not, in connection with 
cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises, or 
commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial 
office.”) 
63 See Pennsylvania Family Institute, Inc. v. Celluci, 489 F.Supp.2d 447, 456-57 (E.D.Pa.2007) 
(summarizing cases since White and issuing preliminary injunction against enforcement of Pennsylvania’s 
“pledges and promises” clause);  See also Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. v. Kentucky Judicial 
Conduct Comm’n, 388 F.3d 224, 228 (6th Cir.2004) (denying stay of injunction prohibiting enforcement of 
Kentucky “pledges and promises” clause,  agreeing that such clause is a de facto “announce”  clause in 
disguise).  
64 See Indiana Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 463 F.Supp.2d 879, 889 (N.D. Ind. 2006)(“[T]here is no real 
distinction between announcing one’s views on legal or political issues and making a statement that 
commits or ‘appears to commit’ a judicial candidate with respect to cases, controversies, and issues that are 
likely to come before the court.”  A canon that prohibited judges or judicial candidates from making 
commitments to “certain results in particular cases” would be more narrowly tailored to accommodate 
speech.). 
65 Id. at 805. 
66 Id. at 806-808 
67 Id. at 783. 
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but stated that “even if” this were true the Minnesota cannon failed strict scrutiny.68  
Thus, the important lesson of White is that if there is a relevant distinction between 
judicial elections and legislative or executive elections, attorneys running for legislative 
or executive office (like Mike Nifong) are entitled to more deference than judges, not 
less.69
 
In considering whether Gentile is still good law with respect to elected 
prosecutors following White, it may be helpful to consider a recent example of judicial 
speech that has been determined to be protected by the first amendment.  In Mississippi 
Commission on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, the Supreme Court of Mississippi 
declined to impose sanctions on a sitting judge who made comments in a letter to the 
editor of a newspaper (and subsequently during a radio interview) taking a position 
against gay rights legislation.70  The sitting judge indicated that homosexuality was a 
“mental illness” and that in his opinion gays “belong in mental institutions.”71    The 
Judicial Conduct Commission recommended that the judge be sanctioned for conduct 
“that cast(s) doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially.”72  The Supreme Court of 
Mississippi, citing White, declined to sanction the judge, ruling that the judge’s 
comments were constitutionally protected, and that the requested discipline would violate 
the first amendment.73  The court rejected the state’s interest in “impartiality” of jurists as 
justifying the restraint on Wilkerson’s speech, because a motion to recuse any judge who 
revealed such anti-gay bias would more narrowly satisfy the state’s compelling interest in 
an impartial judiciary.74 Quite simply, if such comments by a sitting judge about 
homosexuality are protected after White, it seems hard to imagine that many of the 
statements that District Attorney Mike Nifong made to the media about the Duke 
Lacrosse investigation would not be similarly protected had Nifong raised a first 
amendment defense in his disbarment proceeding.   
 
 
 
IV.   Do Rules 3.6 and 3.8(f) Survive Strict Scrutiny after White? 
 
 
 If White controls, and the court applies strict scrutiny for the speech of elected 
prosecutors, then there is ample room to argue that no compelling government interest is 
served by certain provisions in Rules 3.6 and 3.8(f).  A prior restraint will survive strict 
scrutiny only if “the restriction operate(s) without unnecessarily circumscribing protected 
expression.”75
 
                                                 
68  Id. 
69 Cf. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002). 
70 876 So.2d 1006 (Miss. 2004). 
71 Id. at 1008. 
72 Id. at 1009, citing MISS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4(A)(1). 
73 Id. at 1013.   
74 Id. at 1015.  “We find no compelling state interest in requiring a partial judge to keep quiet about his 
prejudice so that he or she will appear impartial.”  Id.  
75 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1982). 
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    A.  Potential Infirmities in Rule 3.6
 
 As noted above, one could argue that states may not restrict the political speech of 
elected prosecutors unless such speech presents a “clear” or “imminent” threat to ongoing 
judicial proceedings.  Such an attorney disciplinary standard is already in effect in many 
states.76 Moreover, even if the “substantial risk” standard of Model Rule 3.6 survives 
White, Comment [5] to Rule 3.6 essentially creates a presumption that certain topics pose 
a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding.  Two of the 
topics listed in Comment [5] seem particularly suspect under true strict scrutiny analysis. 
 
 The first dubious “off-limits” topic is the “identity of witnesses.”  What 
compelling government interest justifies precluding a prosecutor from identifying the 
witnesses to criminal proceedings?  Arguably, public identification could invade the 
individual’s privacy, or subject a witness to possible intimidation prior to trial.  However, 
even if those interests are compelling, this limitation is not narrowly tailored to serve 
either of them.  Identifying a witness is presumptively prejudicial regardless of what type 
of a criminal proceeding the witness is involved in (e.g., larceny or rape), regardless of 
whether the witness has consented to their name being disclosed (e.g., a corporate 
whistleblower who has already given statements to the media), and regardless of whether 
the identification occurs six months prior to trial or six hours.  Imagine the case of the 
victim of a vicious home invasion, beating, and robbery where the victim identified the 
perpetrator from the hospital bed.  Read literally, ABA Model Rule 3.6(a) Comment [5] 
would prohibit the prosecutor from announcing to the media that “’John Jones’ was 
attacked at gunpoint in his home last night and is in critical condition, but is expected to 
recover and be able to testify at trial.”  Because the victim is also a witness, such a 
statement would violate the literal terms of the comment.  While there may be 
circumstances where the prosecutor may choose for strategic or policy reasons to 
withhold the name of a crime victim,77 there appears to be no categorical reason to 
preclude it in all circumstances.  Certainly, the identity of the victim/witness will 
eventually be revealed in court. 
 
 Comment [5] also includes in the list of presumptively prejudicial material any 
public comment regarding the “identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be 
presented.”  This too may be overbroad.  A literal reading of the comment would prevent 
a district attorney from commenting that an alleged victim suffered severe physical 
injuries, assuming that this evidence was expected to be presented at trial (e.g., in an 
assault case that the alleged victim suffered a stab wound, or in a rape case that the 
alleged victim suffered scratching, bruising, and vaginal swelling).  It would also prohibit 
a prosecutor from announcing to the media that, upon completion of a lengthy narcotics 
investigation, police had seized 200 kilograms of high purity cocaine.  Or, that a terrorist 
plot aimed at JFK airport was thwarted and a truckload of explosives was uncovered.  It 
                                                 
76 Supra, note 11. 
77 Many state statutes prohibit law enforcement officials from releasing the name of sexual assault victims.   
See, e.g., Cal. Pen. Code §293 (2007); N.Y. CLS Civ. R. §50-b (2007).  Even in states that have not enacted 
such express prohibitions, prosecutors routinely decline to release the name of rape victims in order to 
encourage reporting and to protect the victim’s privacy.  
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would be rare indeed to find a prosecutor in this country who did not think that 
statements like these are critical to informing the public about dangerous activity afoot in 
the community.  “The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures 
aimed at assuring its security.”78
 
Certainly, it is not uncommon for prosecutors or police to display seized evidence 
at a press conference announcing an arrest or indictment, such as a large cache of 
narcotics, seized weapons, or other contraband.  The only conceivable justification for 
prohibiting such speech is that, once the public learns of the presence of physical 
evidence, they may reach conclusions about the guilt of the defendant even if that same 
evidence is later suppressed or not introduced at trial.  But again, the limitation on Rule 
3.6 is not narrowly tailored to meet even this legitimate government objective.  The 
limitation applies whether the prosecutor mentions physical evidence inextricably linked 
to the defendant (e.g. “the defendant’s fingerprints were found at the scene”) or generic 
evidence seized during the investigation but not necessarily tied by circumstances or 
forensics to a named defendant (“the perpetrator, in his haste to get out of the bank, left a 
bag of money at the door”).  The rule simply does not distinguish between theses two 
very different types of situations. 
 
Furthermore, the rule says nothing about timing.  If a statement about physical 
evidence seized is made soon after arrest and well before trial, it is unlikely to have any 
effect on the proceedings, even if the physical evidence is later suppressed.79  Individual 
voir dire of potential jurors prior to trial may serve to screen out citizens who have heard 
or seen public reports of the case.80  It is notable that the precursor to Model Rule 3.6, 
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-107, allowed an attorney 
associated with a criminal investigation to make public comment “at the time of the 
seizure, [about] a description of the physical evidence seized, other than a confession, 
admission, or statement.”81
 
In addition, Rule 3.6  harbors several lurking vagueness problems.  In the list of 
topics that “ordinarily” will result in substantial prejudice contained in Comment [5], 
subparagraph (1) refers to the character, reputation, or criminal record of a party, suspect 
or witness, and subparagraph (2) refers to the “existence or contents of any confession… 
or statement” given by a defendant or suspect, or their failure to give such a statement.  
These subparagraphs relate back to Rule 3.6(a); that is, statements about these topics are 
                                                 
78 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.6(a) Comment [1]. 
79 “That time soothes and erases is a perfectly natural phenomenon.” Patton v. Young, 467 U.S. 1025, 1034 
(1984) (ruling that where trial took place four years  after allegedly prejudicial publicity, trial court did not 
commit manifest error in finding the jury impartial.) 
80 See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1044 (Kennedy, J.)(suggesting that length of time before trial and size of county 
population are important factors to consider in determining whether substantial likelihood of material 
prejudice standard is met). 
81 See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR-7-107(c).  Several state in their attorney 
discipline codes presently allow for comment on seized evidence.  See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. R. 32, DR-7-
107; Neb. R. Prof’l Responsibility 7-107(c); N.Y.R. Prof’l Responsibility DR 7-107(c). 
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only unethical if they pose a substantial risk of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding.82  
However, the word “suspect” is capable of at least two possible constructions.  The word 
“suspect” could have been placed in the rule for timing reasons; during an investigation it 
is impermissible to discuss the confession of a suspect, and after an indictment it is 
impermissible to discuss the confession of a charged defendant.  Or, the rule could be 
suggesting that it is impermissible to discuss the confession or criminal record of a 
suspect, regardless of whether or not that person ends up being indicted, if the comment 
about an un-indicted suspect poses a risk of prejudicing the proceedings against other 
defendants.  Neither the rule nor its comments shed any light on which of these two 
constructions is correct. 
 
Imagine the case of an armed bank robbery committed by three perpetrators.  One 
of the suspects is shot and killed by police as he flees the bank and dies at the scene.  
Could the prosecutor, consistent with Rule 3.6, talk to the media about the prior criminal 
record or deathbed confession of that deceased accomplice?  This is more than a 
rhetorical question.  Mike Nifong made several statements to the media that were 
disparaging of the Duke Lacrosse team generally, including criticizing them for being 
“hooligans” and for failing to come forward with information.  Yet only three of these 
players were indicted.  When one reads the disciplinary opinion and the transcript of the 
hearing order, one cannot help but be left with the impression that the panel believed 
Mike Nifong had impermissibly tainted the reputation of the entire Duke Lacrosse 
program.83  Is it permissible to discipline Nifong for comments related to suspects who 
were never indicted, and therefore could not have had their adjudicatory proceedings 
tainted?  What “compelling” interest does the state have in preventing a prosecutor from 
discussing alleged “hooliganism” of varsity athletes at an elite university, or their 
tendency to stick together in the face of adversity? 
 
The public records safe-harbor in Rule 3.6(b) is also subject to a vagueness 
objection.   Rule 3.6(b) contains a list of matters that an attorney “may state” to the media 
during a pending judicial proceeding, “notwithstanding” the prohibitions in paragraph (a).  
That is, if the subject of a media statement falls within the safe harbor of paragraph (b), 
an attorney may discuss it even if the matter poses a substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing the proceeding.84  One of topics listed in the safe harbor provision of Rule 
3.6(b) is “information contained in a ‘public record.’”  If the matter which the prosecutor 
discusses with the media is already in the “public record,” it does not constitute an ethical 
                                                 
82 See Devine v. Robinson, 131 F.Supp.2d 963, 970 (N.D.Ill. 2001) (“read in the context of the entire rule, 
subparagraph (b) is easily understood as relating back to subparagraph (a).”) 
83 See Transcript of Disciplinary Commission Hearing dated June 16, 2007,  “Order of Discipline”p.19 
(describing the victims of Mike Nifong’s misconduct as “the three young men to start with, their families, 
the entire lacrosse team and their coach, Duke University, and the justice system in North Carolina and 
elsewhere”)(emphasis supplied). 
84 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.6 Comment [4] “Paragraph (b) identifies specific matters 
about which a lawyer‘s statements would not ordinarily be considered to present a substantial likelihood of 
material prejudice, and should not in any event be considered prohibited by the general prohibitions of 
paragraph (a).  See also Devine v. Robinson, 131 F.Supp.2d at 970 (stating that a plausible interpretation of 
Illinois Rule 3.6 is that if subject matter falls both within safe harbor provision and list of matters ordinarily 
likely to present a risk of serious prejudice, the comment is permissible). 
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violation for the prosecutor to repeat the matter to the press.  For example, it is ordinarily 
improper for a prosecutor to refer publicly to the prior criminal record of the accused.85  
But if the prosecutor files a written bail request in court which details the defendant’s 
criminal past in support of an argument for dangerousness, that past has become part of a 
“public record” and is thereafter open for official comment. 
 
 But what does “public record” mean?  Does it mean information contained in an 
official, publicly available government record?  Or does it mean information that is 
already in the public domain, regardless of how it got there?  This is a critical distinction.  
One could certainly argue that the government does not have a compelling state interest 
in preventing a prosecutor from repeating what is already in the public domain.  The cat 
is already out of the bag.  On the other hand, one could argue that the mere act of 
repeating a contention publicly made by others strengthens the public’s perception of the 
credibility of the allegations, especially when the emphasis comes from a government 
official with inside information about the case. 
 
 In the Nifong case, the North Carolina Disciplinary Commission had the 
opportunity to address this important distinction, but failed to do so.  For example, the 
disciplinary complaint alleged that Nifong violated Rule 3.6 by revealing to Newsweek in 
April, 2006 that the examining nurse at Duke University Hospital concluded that the 
accuser had suffered injuries consistent with sexual assault.86  The Disciplinary 
Commission included this count in one of its findings of improper comment by Nifong,87 
even though the same statement was recounted by Assistant District Attorney David 
Saacks in an Application for a Nontestimonial Identification Order (cheek swabbings for 
DNA) submitted to the Durham Superior Court on March 23, 2006.88  Nifong defended 
the disciplinary complaint on this count by alleging that the nurse’s conclusions were 
matters contained in a public record, but the Disciplinary Commission in its final order 
failed even to discuss this defense.89
 
 Similarly, Nifong was disciplined for commenting to the media on the status of 
DNA tests that were being performed on items taken from the accuser, the alleged crime 
                                                 
85 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.6(a), Comment [5](1). 
86 Complaint ¶ 65.   
87 Findings of Fact ¶ 39, and Conclusions of Law ¶ (a).  Sane Nurse examiner Tara Levicy met with 
Durham Police investigators on March 16, 2005 to  
88Durham County Superior Court Nontestimonial Identification Order, March 23, 2006 (on file with 
author). The SANE nurse examiner report, completed on March 14, 2005, noted that the alleged victim had 
non bleeding scratches on her heel and knees, and “diffuse edema of the vaginal walls,’ i.e. swelling.  See  
http://johnsville.blogspot.com/2006/06/duke-lacrosse-scandal-nifong-lies.html (last visited January 24, 
2008).  The SANE nurse met with investigators on March 16, 2006 and March 21, 2006 to further explain 
her examination report and to review her assessment of the alleged victim’s appearance and demeanor in 
the early morning hours after the purported attack.  In these interviews, the SANE nurse told the 
investigator that the accuser’s swelling, scratches, statements of pain, hysterical demeanor, and tenderness 
to the touch were in her view consistent with sexual assault.  See Stuart Taylor Jr. and KC Johnson, UNTIL 
PROVEN INNOCENT 33-35, 47 (2007).  The Application for Nontestimonial Identification Order dated 
March 23, 2006—after these interviews were conducted but before Nifong’s public statements on this 
subject—purported to summarize both the SANE examination report and the subsequent interviews.     
89 Motion to Dismiss and Answer ¶ 56. 
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scene, and samples taken from suspects pursuant to judicial order.  In May 2006, Nifong 
stated to a television news reporter, “My guess is that there are many questions that many 
people are asking that they would not be asking if they saw the results” and that “They’re 
[DNA reports] not things that the defense releases unless they unquestionably support 
their positions.”90  In fact, DNA tests results at that time did not “unquestionably” 
support the defense position.  Between May 4 and May 9, 2006, DNA Security learned 
that two false fingernails seized from the house where the lacrosse party occurred (one in 
the bathroom trash and one in a bedroom of the house on a computer) each harbored 
DNA that was not inconsistent with DNA samples taken from Duke lacrosse players.91  
The report from DNA Security was turned over to defense attorneys on May 12, 2006, 
and on that very afternoon counsel for one of the defendants held a press conference to 
announce to the media that no DNA from any lacrosse player was found on specimens 
taken from the accuser’s person at the hospital.92   Nifong defended the above statements 
to the media on the grounds that the DNA aspect of the investigation had “already 
become a subject of media attention” and he was just responding to questions the media 
“asked about information received from other sources.”93  However, the Commission’s 
final order sanctioned Nifong for these public comments, without ever addressing 
whether they was justified by matters already in the public domain.94  Undoubtedly the 
Commission was motivated by the potentially misleading nature of Nifong’s DNA 
comments, especially in light of later revelations that he had suppressed exculpatory 
evidence by directing DNA Security personnel to omit from their report the fact that 
DNA from four unidentified males (not lacrosse players) was found on rape kit items 
swabbed from the accuser on March 14, 2006.95  But Nifong was not charged with 
making false or misleading public statements about DNA, he was charged with making 
statements that posed a substantial risk of prejudicing proceedings, a charge that contains 
a specific safe harbor for matters already in the public domain.  If is difficult to ascertain 
how an oblique reference to the existence of information not released by defense counsel 
risks prejudicing future adjudicatory proceedings, where the information is not identified 
with specificity and where there has already been substantial public discussion of the 
general topic.  
 
 
                                                 
90 Findings of Fact ¶ 61. 
91 See North Carolina v. Evans, Finnerty & Seligmann, 06 CRS 5581-5583, 4331-4336, Defendants’ 
Motion to Compel Discovery:  Expert D.N.A. Analysis, p  9-10 (December 13, 2006).  
92 Aaron Beard, Associated Press “No Link to Duke Players after 2nd Test,”  May 14, 2006 BRADENTON 
HERALD, p. 5.  See Stuart Taylor Jr. and KC Johnson, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT 219-223 (2007).   This 
statement by defense counsel followed defense appearances in early April after a first round of tests 
performed by the State Bureau of Investigations (SBI) revealed no semen, blood or saliva in vaginal swabs 
taken from the accuser.  See NBC Today Show, April 11, 2006, 2006 WLNR 6110285 (statement by 
defense attorney Wade Smith that “no DNA from any young man tested was found anywhere on or about 
the body of this woman.”)  
93 Motion to Dismiss and Answer ¶ 44. 
94 Findings of Fact ¶ 61; Conclusions of Law ¶ (a).  The final order of discipline further glosses over this 
difficult “public domain” issue by concluding that Nifong’s impermissible comments were made in “May, 
2006” without reference to any particular date in May.  Findings of Fact ¶ 61.   
95 Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications;  A Fundamental 
Failure to “Do Justice,”, 76 FORD. L. REV. 1137, 1359-1360 (2007). 
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Thus far, only the state of Maryland appears to have grappled with the appropriate 
definition of “public record” in its safe harbor provision of Rule 3.6.  In Attorney 
Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Gansler, an elected State’s Attorney was 
disciplined for misconduct in several high profile murder cases.96  During the course of 
four investigations and prosecutions, Gansler made a variety of comments to the media 
during press conferences relating to physical evidence collected at a crime scene, 
confessions obtained from suspects, the prior criminal records of the accused, and plea 
agreements offered to the defendants.  All of these topics are presumptively prejudicial 
under the Maryland version of Model Rule 3.6 Comment [5].  The Attorney Grievance 
Commission of Maryland brought misconduct charges against Gansler, and found after a 
hearing that all these comments violated Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6.  On 
review, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the safe harbor provision in Maryland 
Rule 3.6, allowing comments about information that could be found in “public record,” 
was sufficiently vague to justify many of the prosecutor’s comments.  Many details 
concerning seized evidence, confessions, and prior criminal records had already been 
leaked by others (presumably the police) and reported in newspapers before the district 
attorney commented on them.  The court noted that the broad interpretation of the public 
records safe harbor would allow comment both on any matters that had previously been 
discussed in a public forum, including newspaper and television reports, as well as all 
information available from official government records and court records.97  The Court 
therefore reversed the professional discipline of Gansler with respect to several counts of 
the misconduct complaint.  It affirmed a finding that Gansler violated Rule 3.6 in only 
two respects; by stating his opinion regarding the guilt of several defendants and by 
commenting on previously undisclosed confessions, evidence, and guilty plea offers.  The 
Court noted that for future cases, however, they were going to restrict the public record 
safe harbor under Rule 3.6 to that information accessible in public governmental 
records.98  They stressed that extrajudicial comments, especially those made by 
prosecutors, directly thwart the goal of having the defendant tried by an impartial jury 
which has heard as little as possible about the case. 
 
B.  Potential Infirmities in Rule 3.8(f)
 
Turning to the limitations on extrajudicial comments posed by Rule 3.8(f), it is 
also doubtful whether this provision would survive strict scrutiny if challenged on first 
amendment grounds after White, at least as applied to an elected prosecutor speaking 
during a campaign.  Is protecting the reputation of the accused, over and above the 
integrity of the proceedings, a compelling government interest?  If the defendant is 
innocent, on obviously compelling state interest in limiting a prosecutor’s speech lies in 
protecting an accused from an erroneous guilty finding that may result if public sentiment 
becomes inflamed prior to trial.  But that interest is served by Rule 3.6, which looks at the 
potential effect of speech in the adjudicatory proceedings.  If the defendant is guilty, no 
compelling government interest is served by protecting the defendant from public 
opprobrium for his conduct.  Retribution is on of the legitimate aims of the criminal law, 
                                                 
96 Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 548 (Md. 2003). 
97 Id. at 567. 
98 Id. at 568-69 
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and retribution is served when citizens band together to condemn behavior that violates 
societal norms.99
 
Conceivably, the state might have an interest in protecting innocent defendants, 
later found innocent through acquittal or the dismissal of criminal proceedings, from 
having their reputations impaired before they reenter society.  But, in this situation, 
vindication by acquittal or dismissal is at least one step towards repairing any damage to 
reputation resulting from indictment and media comment.  More importantly, however, 
the innocent defendant has a potential civil recourse against the prosecutor who 
disparages his reputation in the media under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (deprivation of a liberty 
interest under color of state law).100  The Supreme Court could consider the availability 
of this remedy a sufficiently adequate deterrent to obviate the need for prior restraint of a 
prosecutor’s speech.  On October 5, 2007 David Evans, Collin Finnerty, and Reade 
Seligmann filed a civil complaint against Mike Nifong, as well as thirteen other state and 
municipal employees and entities including the Durham Police Department.101  Nifong 
himself is named in eight counts of this complaint, including federal claims under 42 
U.S.C. §1983 for improper public statements, and state tort claims for malicious 
prosecution, obstruction of justice, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.102   
The complaint, which requests unspecified compensatory and punitive damages, is 
presently pending in United States District Court for the Middle District of North 
Carolina.  The enormity of the potential civil recovery against Nifong and the City of 
Durham may itself act as such a powerful deterrent to future acts of false, misleading or 
defamatory speech by prosecutors across this country as to make the prior restraint of 
Rule 3.8(f) unnecessary.  
 
Note that Rule 3.8(f) prohibits speech that tends to heighten public condemnation 
of the accused unless such speech is both “necessary to inform the public of the nature 
and extent of the prosecutor’s action” and serves “a legitimate law enforcement purpose.”  
Unless condemning speech meets both of these tests, it is prohibited.  The problem with 
this language is that it turns strict scrutiny on its head.  Rule 3.8(f) demands that a bar 
disciplinary committee assess the importance of the speech in determining whether it is 
unethical.  But under White, where political speech is concerned the court will demand a 
compelling reason for the restriction, not a compelling reason for the speech.  Political 
speech is presumed to be at the core of first amendment protections, and the court does 
not undertake an individual weighing of the value of words spoken in the electoral 
                                                 
99 See Emile Durkheim, THE DIVISION OF LAW IN SOCIETY, p.62-63 (W.D. Halls, Transl., 1984) 
(“[Punishment] serves only very incidentally, to correct the guilty person or to scare off any possible 
imitators…  Its real function is to maintain inviolate the cohesion of society by sustaining the common 
consciousness in all its vigor.”) 
100 See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993) (prosecutors are entitled only to qualified good 
faith immunity in suits involving conduct which is not quasi judicial in nature, and this includes allegedly 
inflammatory statements to press.); Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783, 791 (11th Cir.1998) (prosecutor 
could be civilly liable for due process violation under §1983 for conduct in issuing defamatory press 
release). 
101 See Evans et al v. City of Durham at al., Civ. Action  No. 07-739 (United States District Court,  M. D. 
N. C., October 5, 2007)(available at http://media.mgnetwork.com/ncn/pdf/071005_duke.pdf). 
102 Id. 
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context.  By allowing only extrajudicial condemning speech that is “necessary,” the rule 
risks chilling political speech that is protected by the first amendment. 
 
Imagine a murder case where the defendant killed multiple victims in a 
particularly horrific manner.  Assume further that the trial and sentencing are complete, 
that the defendant’s first appeal has been exhausted, and that the defendant is serving a 
mandatory life sentence in prison.  The District Attorney, who personally handled the 
case, is up for re-election.  She grants a television interview in which the describes the 
case as the most difficult of her career, she replays some of the more horrific elements of 
the crime, reveals that she still has nightmares about them, and she characterizes the 
defendant as an “animal” and “pure evil” and deserving of the full condemnation of 
society.  She also urges the legislature to reinstate the death penalty in her jurisdiction.  
The trial and sentencing are over; these comments cannot reasonably be viewed as posing 
a substantial risk of prejudicing adjudicatory proceedings.  But if Rule 3.8 imposes 
restrictions on prosecutors above and beyond those imposed by Rule 3.6,103 these 
comments certainly seem to heighten public condemnation of the accused.  What 
“compelling” state interest possibly justifies censuring that speech?  After all, the 
defendant is entitled to a fair trial, “not a friendly public.”104
 
In Gentile, the Supreme Court ruled that the “substantial likelihood of material 
prejudice” standard of Nevada Rule 3.6 satisfied the first amendment because it was 
viewpoint neutral and it “merely postpones the attorneys’ comments until after the 
trial.”105   If Rule 3.8 is read to limit prosecutor’s speech without regard to whether it 
poses a risk to the fairness of the proceedings, it may not satisfy rigorous constitutional 
scrutiny.  In fact, one of the members of the ABA Ethics 2000 Committee thought that 
this 1994 addition to Rule 3.8 was “of doubtful constitutional validity.”106  Ohio, the state 
most recently adopting the Model Rules, rejected 3.8(f) after prosecutors in that state 
expressed a similar concern.107  Many states that otherwise follow the ABA Model Rules 
                                                 
103 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.8(f).  The ABA Comment on Rule 3.8(f) states that this rule is 
“supplemental” to other rules governing attorney speech, but also says that comments that do not violate 
the safe harbor of 3.6(b) or the fair reply provision of 3.6(c) do not violate 3.8(f).  Thus, a prosecutor who 
makes a statement to the press about information contained in a public record (such as the prior criminal 
history of the accused) presumably cannot be disciplined under Rule 3.8(f) even if this statement heightens 
public condemnation of the accused, if the public comment otherwise complies with the safe harbor 
provision of Rule 3.6(b).  But there is an ambiguity here.  What does Rule 3.8(f) add if the safe harbor of 
Rule 3.6(b) and (c) are allowed?  In Devine the United States District Court in Illinois declared there “may” 
be no conflict between these rules.  See Devine v. Robinson, 131 F.Supp.2d 963, 971 (2001).  But what 
about the traditional rule of statutory construction that the more specific rule trumps the more general?  
Rule 3.6 applies to all attorneys, and Rule 3.8 applies only to prosecutors.  If there is a conflict, traditional 
rules of statutory construction would suggest that the more specific provisions of Rule 3.8 should govern. 
104 See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss in Devine v. Robinson, 131 
F.Supp.2d 963 at p. 13. 
105 Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1076. 
106 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, minutes of 
meeting October 15-19, 1999, Available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/minoct99.pdf. 
107 See letter of Mario County Prosecuting Attorneys to Task Force of Ohio Supreme Court, Dated 
February 1, 2006 (stating that “Proposed Rule 3.8 goes far beyond that which is necessary to protect the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial and is thus of questionable constitutional validity”), on file with author. 
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do not include a restriction on extrajudicial prosecutor speech similar to Model Rule 
3.8(f).108  Like Ohio, they may have rejected Rule 3.8(f) due to constitutional concerns, 
or simply because regulating speech of government lawyers is so fraught with the 
difficulties of  line-drawing that it is politically impractical.  
 
Between March 27 and March 31, 2006, Mike Nifong declared to a television 
news reporter that “what happened here was one of the worst things that’s happened since 
I have become district attorney.”109  He also stated that “when I look at what happened, I 
was appalled.  I think that most of the people in the community are appalled.”110  These 
statements to the media did not name any suspects.  They did not refer to physical or 
forensic evidence, the character or reputation of alleged perpetrators, or the expected trial 
testimony.  They were simply expressions by a sitting district attorney, running for re-
election, about why he viewed the allegations in the case as serious, why the public 
should be equally concerned about them, and why he had chosen to prosecute the case 
personally rather than assign the case to a staff member.  Nevertheless, the disciplinary 
commission in North Carolina concluded that these comments “heightened public 
condemnation of the accused,” and included them in its litany of reasons for disbarring 
District Attorney Nifong.111    It certainly would have been prudent for Nifong to have 
included the words “allegedly” before the words “happened’ in this public comment;112 
however, that omission alone cannot translate protected speech into unprotected speech, 
especially when it occurred prior to the return of DNA results when Nifong may have 
still entertained a good faith belief that a sexual assault in fact had occurred.  I am 
convinced that the former District Attorney had a first amendment right to make these 
particular public comments, and that if Rule 3.8(f) is read to preclude them, it is most 
certainly overbroad.113
 
                                                 
108 See Ala. Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rule 3.8, Alaska R. Prof’l Conduct 3.8, Conn. Rules of Prof'l Conduct 
3.8, Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4-3.8, Haw. Rules of Prof'l Conduct Rule 3.8, KRPC 3.8, Ky. SCR 3.130, Rule 3.8, 
MRPC 3.8, Minn. Rules of Prof'l Conduct 3.8, Miss. Rules of Prof'l Conduct Rule 3.8, N.M. R. Prof. 
Conduct 16-308, Ohio Prof. Cond. Rule 3.8, ORPC 3.8, Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 3.8, Tex. R. Prof 
Conduct 3.09, Utah Rules of Prof'l Conduct Rule 3.8, Vt. Prof. Cond. Rule 3.8, W. Va. Prof. Cond., Rule 
3.8, Wis. SCR 20:3.8. 
109 Findings of Fact ¶ 33. 
110 Id. 
111 Conclusions of Law ¶ (a). 
112 See ABA MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, R. 3.6 Comment [5].  
113 The former District Attorney did not directly challenge North Carolina Rules 3.6 or 3.8 on First 
Amendment grounds, either as applied to him directly or as facially overbroad.  See Motion to Dismiss and 
Answer Dated 2/28/07.  With respect to the statement referenced above, Nifong claimed that he did not 
intend to heighten public condemnation of the accused and did not intend to substantially prejudice the 
proceedings.  “Defendant made the statements outlined in paragraphs 12 through 175 of the Amended 
Complaint at a time when there was an ongoing investigation relating to the facts contained in the affidavit 
attached to the Application for Nontestimonial Identification Order, a copy of which is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit ‘A.’  The statements made between March 27, 2006 and April 
3, 2006 were made at a time when no individual suspects had been identified and were an effort by the 
defendant to reassure the community that the case was being actively investigated by the Durham Police 
Department in an effort to obtain assistance in receiving evidence and information necessary to further the 
criminal investigation.”  Id. at p.4 ¶10. 
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It is also troubling that Rule 3.8(f)’s prohibition of speech that “heighten(s) public 
condemnation of the accused” is silent as to the state of mind that must be present before 
a violation may be found.  Must the prosecutor know that his media statements serve no 
legitimate purpose, know that they are not necessary to inform the public about the nature 
and extent of his actions, and either know or intend that they will heighten public 
condemnation of the accused?  One member of the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission   
suggested that the threshold for discipline under Rule 3.8(f) should be a “knowing” 
violation, consistent with Rule 3.6.114  But the rule was never amended in accordance 
with this suggestion.115
 
 Imagine that upon indicting an alleged serial child rapist the prosecutor states that, 
“Pedophilia is a scourge in our society.  Preying on innocent children is the worst form of 
evil, and fighting it will be the highest priority of my office.  I will do everything in my 
power to ensure that these heinous criminals are segregated from society.”  Imagine 
further that the prosecutor thinks that there are two legitimate law enforcement purposes 
for this comment; first, to deter would-be criminals from sexually molesting children, and 
second, to inform the public in an election year about how he will exercise his discretion 
in employing scarce law enforcement resources.  If a bar discipline board disagrees with 
the prosecutor that the reasons for his public comments are necessary or legitimate, but 
the speaker nonetheless held them in good faith, may the speaker be sanctioned for these 
comments?  That is, are “necessity” and “legitimacy” to be determined after the fact by 
the disciplinary board, or from the subjective point of view of the speaker? 
 
 This lack of clarity about the state of mind requirement for a 3.8(f) violation could 
seriously chill campaign speech for elected prosecutors.  For example, a prosecutor may 
feel that it is a “legitimate law enforcement purpose” to explain to the electorate the 
reasons for his charging decisions and why he is making the prosecution of certain 
heinous offenses priorities in his community, but nonetheless refrain from such speech 
for fear that a disciplinary panel may consider them to have no legitimate purpose other 
than to heighten public condemnation of the accused.  That is, they may be hesitant to 
engage in public discourse about ongoing criminal cases for fear that bar overseers will 
examine the justification for their speech from a purely objective perspective after the 
fact.  Candidates should not have to speculate at their peril about the contours of a prior 
restraint of political speech.  Equally worrisome is the possibility that disciplinary 
committees interpreting Rule 3.8(f) may not consider campaign speech to have any 
“legitimate law enforcement purpose” whatsoever.  If a prosecutor’s freedom to 
campaign is to be respected, it would appear that the threshold for a violation of 3.8(f) 
should at a minimum be gross recklessness, which is consistent with the “knew or should 
have known” standard of Rule 3.6.  The rule’s silence on this critical intent issue clearly 
poses a serious problem after White.   
                                                 
114 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.6(a) requires that a lawyer “know or reasonably should know” 
that his comments will be disseminated and will pose a substantial risk of material prejudice to the 
proceeding. 
115 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, minutes of 
meeting October 15-19, 1999. 
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V.   Conclusion 
 
 The questions generated in this essay are not intended to condone or excuse the 
actions of District Attorney Mike Nifong in the Duke Lacrosse investigation.  His 
mishandling of this rape case deserves the derision it has received from scholars, judges, 
and leaders of the bar.  But the profession paints with too broad a brush when it 
condemns so many of Nifong’s statements to the media as impermissible under present 
disciplinary rules.  Gentile is no longer the only game in town when it comes to an 
attorney’s statements to the media.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White requires that when dealing with elected officials and political speech, 
disciplinary rules must be both narrowly tailored and narrowly construed in order to 
survive first amendment scrutiny.  The North Carolina Disciplinary Commission’s 
decision in the Nifong matter failed to recognize many of the nuances of Rule 3.6 and 3.8 
that deserve serious consideration. 
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